








Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Vermeulen, E. P. M. (2005). Network effects and regulatory competition. (TILEC Discussion Paper; Vol. 2005-
028). TILEC.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.





NETWORK EFFECTS AND REGULATORY COMPETITION 
 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EXPECTATIONS AND CHALLENGES OF 
PARTNERSHIP LAW REFORM 
 





This article examines the theoretical arguments for and against the importance 
of new partnership-type business forms. Section 1 briefly reviews the history of 
partnership law and reform in Europe. The review of traditional partnership law 
reveals that the absence of new business forms may be due to status quo bias 
and network effects. Section 2 turns to the importance of partnership law reform 
and the introduction of new business forms to a robust economy. Section 3 
evaluates whether we can project a pattern of regulatory competition in the 
business organization law context that could prompt lawmakers to innovate by 





Until recently national legislatures within the European Union (EU) had few 
incentives to introduce legal innovations in the context of closely held business 
firms, despite potential benefits for governments, such as tax revenue and 
economic growth. In many European jurisdictions, the provisions of the 
dominant closely held business form, the close corporation, are somehow linked 
to its publicly held counterpart. This may account for a ‘lock-in’ to the existing 
legal framework and mandatory provisions.1 Some take it for granted that when 
network or learning benefits are present, the value of legal products such as 
1 
                                                 
*  Professor of Law and Management Tilburg University Faculty of Law, Fellow Center 
for Company Law and Tilburg Law and Economics Center, and Legal Counsel Philips 
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1  See generally Erik P.M. Vermeulen, The Evolution of Legal Business Forms in 
Europe and the United States, Venture Capital, Joint Venture and Partnership 




                                                
business forms increases.2 The effect of these benefits is to create standard 
provisions in corporation and partnership law. For example, the fact that the 
majority of closely held business firms select the domestic close corporation law 
to govern their rights and duties may actually lead to a network benefit for the 
firms using this particular business form. As a result, domestic close corporation 
forms maintain and strengthen their leading position.  
Indeed, newly formed firms will likely migrate to those business forms 
that confer large network and learning benefits to the user. This will mean that 
demand will be higher than it otherwise might be, which in turn will lead to the 
supply of standards rather than customized terms that benefit a variety of closely 
held firms. Because standardized terms offer certainty, when advising clients 
about choice-of-business-form decisions, domestic lawyers will contribute to the 
unwillingness of firms to substitute the standard form for new structures.3 The 
upshot is that lawmakers are arguably reluctant to innovate. 
A number of other reasons limit legal innovation in business 
organization law. The involvement of the European legislature in developing a 
harmonization programme designed to create a degree of uniformity in the law 
regarding creditor and investor protection throughout the European Union has 
tended to restrict innovation in business organization law in general. This 
harmonization process, which introduces essential minimum standards and 
tolerates a degree of diversity at a national level, applies mainly to the public 
corporation. Even though the EU directives initially focused on public 
corporations, both national and EU lawmakers tend to extend their reach to the 
close corporation when introducing policy reforms. Given the network and 
learning effects, imposing mandatory rules could be thought to encourage the 
 
2  Kahan, M. and Klausner, M., Path Depenedence in Corporate Contracting: 
Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, Eashington University Law 
Quaterly 74 (1996), pp. 347-366; Kahan, M. and Klausner, M., Standardization and 
Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), Virginia 
Law Review 83 (1997), pp. 713-770; Klausner, M., Corporations, Corporate Law, 
and Network of Contracts, Virginia Law Review 81 (1995), pp. 757-852. 
3  Lawyers and other professional advisors can indeed play a significant role in the 
‘lock-in’ to adopted contracts. If a particular lawyer spends time and money on 
customizing an alternative term that will benefit other lawyers and their clients 
generally, that lawyer may face a potential free-rider problem. As a result, the drafting 
and designing of innovative contract terms is not in itself always cost-effective. 
Efforts to enhance change will not live up to expectations. The possible failure of the 
new term, which might damage the lawyer’s professional reputation and even ruin his 
career, also tends to confine lawyers to a more passive role by encouraging them to 
follow the herd and to some extent to ignore their own information and judgments 
regarding the merits of their decisions. See, e.g., Kahan, M. and Klausner, M., Path 
Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing returns, Herd Behavior and 




                                                
standardization effect, hence decreasing the prospects for changing European 
business organization laws. 
The evolution of European business organization law may well turn on 
the prospect of national lawmakers finding compelling reasons to abandon the 
defence of well-entrenched legal forms and the mandatory rules that reinforce 
their position and so block the diffusion of new innovative legal rules. Yet given 
the way in which lawmakers have responded to date, the emergence of new 
separate legal business forms responsive to the needs of closely held firms 
would appear improbable, particularly in absence of the conditions necessary for 
competitive lawmaking. For several reasons, in most European jurisdictions, the 
small and medium-sized business community is not likely to play an important 
part in the development of business organization legislation. Except for the 
United Kingdom, where accountants have already played a central role in the 
adoption of a ‘limited liability partnership’ statute, the national lawmaking 
process in Europe is led by lawmakers and civil servants who give priority to the 
preferences of large firms. Thus, unless small and medium-sized enterprises and 
affiliated interest groups are able to influence the pattern of lawmaking, any 
statutory changes made will not be particularly beneficial to closely held firms. 
Yet the modernization of business organization laws is now high on the 
policy agenda in Europe. The European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) decisions in the 
Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art cases have led to more and more 
jurisdictions taking actions.4 Indeed, the ECJ’s decisions appear to trigger the 
development of competitive lawmaking in Europe, which could give member 
states incentives to adopt, for example, modern corporation and partnership law 
statutes that are in line with the requirements of modern businesses. Further 
support for this is evidenced by the interest of legislatures in supplying new 
business forms in response to the threat of competition posed by offshore 
jurisdictions. Even though there is considerable pent-up demand across Europe 
for firms to organize under the laws of low-regulation jurisdictions, it is 
nevertheless difficult to predict with certitude the circumstances that would lead 
to the development of regulatory competition in the context of partnership 
forms. 
This article attempts to demonstrate the breadth and variety of the 
challenges for partnership law reform. As will be discussed, the law is being 
 
4  Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erthvers-og Selskabbsstyrelsen, [1999] ECR I-1459, 
[1999] 2 CMLR 551 (Centros); Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v. Nordic 
Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), [2002] ECR I-9919 
(Überseering); and Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor 




                                                
challenged substantively, not only by fundamental changes in the nature of 
commerce, but also by competitive pressures on lawmakers. Section 1 discusses 
several factors that play a crucial role in the lawmaking process and prevent 
lawmakers from adopting modern partnership forms that would benefit closely 
held firms more. In section 2, we then turn to the importance of new business 
forms to a robust economy. Section 3 attempts to determine the probability of 
national legislatures adopting new business forms by discussing which 
incentives may create adequate demand for the introduction of such legislation. 
The last section concludes. 
 
 
1 THE STASIS OF ‘TRADITIONAL PARTNERSHIP LAW’ 
 
It is a common refrain that partnership law has an ancestry that can be traced 
back to the Roman societas, the mediaeval commenda and the lex mercatoria or 
Law Merchant.5 The main features of these historic institutions are preserved 
and encapsulated in various ways in the traditional partnership laws in Europe 
and the United States. Although the way business is conducted has altered 
dramatically over the past century, becoming more competitive and 
internationally orientated, partnership laws have essentially been in stasis since 
the codifications in the nineteenth and the early twentieth century.6 Except for a 
 
5  See Story, J., Commentaries on the Law of Partnership, (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1859), p. ix; Zimmermann, R., The Law of Obligations; Roman 
Foundations of the Civilian Tradition, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 451-476; 
See also Blackett-Ord, M., Partnership, The modern law of trade, business and 
professional partnership in England and Wales, (London: Butterworths, 1997), pp. 4-
7; Bromberg, A.R. and Ribstein, L.E., Bromberg and Ribstein on Partnership, (New 
York: Aspen Law and Business, 1999), §1.02; Callison, J.W., Partnership Law and 
Practice, General and Limited Partnerships, (St. Paul: West Group, 2001), §1.02; 
Henning, J.J., The Origins of the Distinction between Loan and Partnership 
Enshrined in Partnership Act 1890, Company Lawyer 22, 2001, p. 75; Raaijmakers, 
M.J.G.C. (2000), Vennootschaps- en Rechtspersonenrecht, (Deventer: Gouda Quint, 
2000a), §1.30-§1.38;  Schücking, Ch., Einführung: Entwicklung und Bedeutung der 
BGB-Gesellschaft, in B. Riegger and L. Weipert (eds.), Münchener Handbuch des 
Gesellschaftsrecht, Band 1, (München: C.H. Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1995), 
p. 13.  
6  In this article, ‘traditional partnership law’ refers to the first codifications of the 
general partnership and its variations, such as the limited partnership and, in civil law 
jurisdictions, the civil partnership. See Heenen, J., Partnership and Other Personal 
Associations for Profit, in A. Conrad (ed.), Business and Private Organizations, 
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law Vol. XIII Chapter 1, (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck,1975), p. 3. Although the analytical framework used in this book is also 
helpful in understanding the ‘participation association’ and ‘internal’ civil 
partnerships, which are nothing more than a simple contract between parties and do 




                                                
few statutory and judicial ‘patching-up’ amendments, principally to solve 
problems with respect to the rights and obligations of a partnership as an entity 
distinct from its members,7 the core principles remain practically unchanged. 
Lawmakers, who have traditionally abdicated their task of partnership law 
reform in favour of satisfying the needs of large multinational enterprises 
organized predominantly as corporations, have only recently acknowledged the 
effects of delayed attention to partnership-type business forms and their 
economic importance.  
Consequently, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which are 
often formed informally without carefully considering and clarifying their 
business relationship in an agreement, continue to suffer the detrimental effects 
of sub-optimal legal rules in many respects. These firms usually lack the 
organization and resources necessary to lobby for the required legislative 
overhaul.8 In addition, despite the dynamic environment in which SMEs operate, 
traditional partnership law has attracted relatively little critical scrutiny from 
academics. Legal scholars have generally shied away from partnership law 
analysis, treating its longstanding principles, such as the general partners’ 
personal liability for a firm’s debts and obligations and broad fiduciary duties, as 
revealed natural law.9 These circumstances lend credence to the perception that 
partnership-type business forms have been a rather dull and unattractive topic of 
study, which, in turn, may explain the discontinuity in the evolution of 
partnership law.  
 
7  These amendments attempt to solve the so-called entity-aggregate dispute, which is 
often viewed as the central problem of partnership law in legal doctrine. 
8  In seeking to design and implement more optimal arrangements for their clients, 
lawyer associations could be powerful interest groups with regard to partnership law 
reform. See Ribstein, L.E., Lawyer Licensing and State Law Efficiency, Working 
Paper, Draft of March, (2002). However, since most users of traditional partnership 
forms are not significant consumers of legal services, lawyers have no high-powered 
incentive to lobby for reform; Romano, R., The Genius of American Corporate Law, 
(Washington: The AEI Press, 1993), p. 27 offers an economic explanation for the lack 
of interest in partnership law reform. Since many disputes in partnerships occur in 
‘endgame’ situations (the parties will not be continuing in a long-term relation of 
repeated play), there will be no gains from future relations. She argues that the 
benefits from the costs of lobbying for a statutory change are therefore scant: the 
change will be used only once in the parties’ mutual dealings. Furthermore, the 
flexibility of partnership law has offered large sophisticated law and accounting firms 
sufficient leeway to contract around inefficient default rules; this partly explains why, 
before extensive malpractice claims were common, these large professional firms 
routinely used the partnership form. 
9  See Hillman, R.W., Private Ordering Within Partnerships, University of Miami Law 
Review 41, (1987), p. 425-432 (enumerating possible explanations as to why 





                                                
With the corporation being the dominant and most important business 
form in the industrial sectors of the economy, it is hardly surprising that 
corporate law has captured the legal imagination. Scholars usually prefer to 
research glamorous corporate issues such as insider trading, hostile takeovers 
and the corporate governance of publicly held corporations with shares traded 
through an organized exchange. Furthermore, those convinced of the importance 
of SMEs to the robustness of the economy have directed their attention to the 
close corporation rather than to partnership-type business forms.10 Courses in 
business organization law understandably seek to keep pace with the scholarly 
work devoted to certain issues, and therefore focus primarily on corporate law 
issues, while either ignoring partnerships and their variations or addressing them 
only briefly by way of comparison.  
Of course, in the light of the related reputational and professional gain, it 
is much more attractive for law professors and their peers to write academic 
articles bearing on the more dynamic problems arising from the regulation of the 
public corporation. Similarly, in order to prepare students for business practice, 
law academics address issues that are most relevant to their future clients’ 
pressing interests. Nevertheless, as the impact of SMEs on the economy is 
significant, the lack of partnership law analysis can be argued to be detrimental. 
Partnerships are common in the agricultural and service sectors, especially in the 
wholesale and retail trade, the tourist sector, construction and professional 
services. In fact, partnership-type business forms play a key role in the 
knowledge-driven economy. The limited partnership, widely used by venture 
capitalists and investors, dominates the venture capital industry.  
At first sight, it might be argued that the lasting prominence of 
traditional partnership forms in many sectors of the economy serves as 
compelling evidence of the capacity of these forms to satisfy the wide-ranging 
needs of many types of firms. Traditional partnership forms are allegedly very 
popular with a broad range of businesses, from small family firms to large law 
and accounting firms, which could explain the lack of attention by scholars and 
practitioners alike.11 That traditional partnership forms have stood the test of 
 
10  This article uses US terminology. For instance, the word ‘close corporation’ is used as 
the equivalent of the modern English ‘private company’ and German Gesellschaft mit 
beschränkter Haftung (GmbH). 
11  The alleged efficiency of traditional partnership law could be an explanation for the 
absence of academic attention. After all, it is not really challenging to promote the 
status quo of partnership law. See Gillette, C.P., Lock-In Effects In Law and Norms, 
Boston University Law Review 78, (1998), p. 824 (arguing that law professors who 
write articles urging the rejection of existing doctrines or who draft amicus briefs 





                                                
time evinces their straightforwardness. However, the view that the longstanding 
partnership law statutes are in fact efficient is naïve.12 It is submitted that even 
though the survival value may provide superficial evidence of efficiency, 
traditional partnership law may very well depend on the history of problems that 
had to be solved in the past but may be irrelevant today (i.e., path dependence).13 
Upon closer examination, it appears that traditional partnership forms are only 
attractive marginally due to their informality and tax advantages in comparison 
to corporations. 
Here, it is worth identifying the main reasons that currently underlie the 
choice of traditional partnership forms. First, partnerships are considered to be 
the default form of business associations in most countries. They may arise 
informally and even inadvertently,14 can often be created by oral agreement and 
operate with considerable informality. In fact, the formation of a partnership 
may be the only possible way of organizing a firm.15 The necessity of 
compliance with various complex, cumbersome, time-consuming and expensive 
formation and operation requirements, calling for considerable legal advice and 
other expert assistance, may act as a serious disincentive to forming a 
corporation. This is especially true in continental Europe, where entrepreneurs 
sometimes view the requirements to obtain the broad corporate liability shield 
(i.e., the formal use of lawyers, the minimum capital requirements and the 
statutory audit and mandatory publication of annual accounts) as draconian.16 
 
12  Cf. Sheikh, S., Partnership Reform: Legal and Practical Implications, International 
Company and Commercial Law Review 12, (2001), p. 89 (noting that the absence of 
any discussion in legal journals or government reports may be evidence of 
partnerships in the United Kingdom functioning well in practice, but also pointing to 
evidence suggesting that the traditional law has not kept in mind the needs of small 
businesses); Law Commission (Law Commission for England and Wales and the 
Scottish Law Commission), Limited Partnerships Act 1907, A Joint Consultation 
Paper, (London: The Stationery Office, 2001), p. 2 (arguing that even though the 
venture capital industry in the United Kingdom is the largest and most developed in 
Europe, accounting for almost half of total European venture capital investment, there 
is no room for complacency). 
13  Cf. Roe, M., Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, Harvard Law Review 109, 
(1996), p. 641.  
14  In most jurisdictions, the existence of a partnership relationship can be proven by 
looking to all the facts and circumstances. 
15  In many jurisdictions, professionals used to be prohibited by ethical considerations 
from practicing with limited liability. Today, professionals are increasingly permitted 
to conduct their business with some sort of liability protection (provided that they 
meet several conditions). See Godfrey, E., Law Without Frontiers, A Comparative 
Survey of the Rules of Professional Ethics Applicable to the Cross-Border Practice of 
Law, (London: Kluwer Law International, 1995). 
16  See, e.g., Chan, C.W. et al, Administratieve lasten – Meningen van ondernemers, 




                                                                                                                        
Similarly, the organizational structure of corporations is perceived as 
particularly troublesome and inflexible, due to the contravention in the corporate 
statutes of lengthy, mandatory provisions designed to solve problems 
encountered in amassing substantial amounts of capital from a large number of 
passive investors or, in more technical terms, when there is a significant 
separation of ownership and control.17 Where the costs of formation and 
Netherlands, entrepreneurs perceive the preparation and disclosure of annual accounts 
as one of the greatest administrative burdens); Nielsen, B., Statistics on New 
Enterprise, Entrepreneurs and Survival of Start-ups: The Danish Enterprise, STI 
Working Paper 2002/7, p. 19 (noting that accounting procedures are the most 
important barriers to establishing a new business in Denmark). See also Centre for 
Law and Business, Faculty of Law, University of  Manchester, Company Law in 
Europe: Recent Developments, A survey of recent developments in core principles of 
companies regulation in selected national systems (produced for the Department of 
Trade and Industry), (1999), pp. 4-5; European Commission, Green Paper on 
Innovation, (1995), pp. 36-37; European Commission, Risk Capital: A Key to Job 
Creation in the European Union, (1998b), pp. 17-19. The recent decision of the 
European Court of Justice (Case 212/97 Centros Ltd v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstryelsen 
[1999] ECR I-1459) illustrates that the draconian capital requirements could persuade 
potential entrepreneurs to incorporate in a more favorable jurisdiction. See 
Wymeersch, E., Centros: A Landmark Decision in European Company Law, in Th. 
Baums, K.J. Hopt, and N. Horn, Corporations, Capital Markets and Business in the 
Law, Liber Amicorum Richard M. Buxbaum, (London: Kluwer Law International, 
2000). See also Case 79/85 Segers v Bedrijfsvereniging voor Bank- en 
Verzekeringswezen, Groothandel en Vrije Beroepen [1986] ECR 2375. Even in the 
United Kingdom, which does not impose minimum capital requirements for closely 
held firms, DTI’s Company Law Steering Group acknowledges that the capital 
maintenance provisions under the Companies Act are complex and often of little 
practical relevance for small firms. See Sheikh, S., Company Law for the 21st Century 
– Part 3: Financial Aspects,  International Company and Commercial Law Review, 
(2002), pp. 108-109. 
17  For an overview of the perceived disadvantages of UK corporation law as a template 
for the regulation of SMEs, see Freedman, J. and Godwin, M., Incorporating the 
micro business: perceptions and misperceptions, in A. Hughes and D.J. Storey (eds.), 
Finance and the Small Firm, (London: Routledge, 1994); Freedman, J., The Quest for 
an Ideal Form for Small Businesses – A Misconceived Enterprise?, in B.A.K. Rider 
and M. Andenas (eds.), Developments in European Company Law Volume 2/1997: 
The Quest for an Ideal Legal Form for Small Businesses, (London: Kluwer Law 
International, 1999); Hicks, A. et al, Alternative Company Structures for the Small 
Business, commissioned and published by The Chartered Association of Certified 
Accountants, (London: Certified Accountants Educational Trust, 1995); Hicks, A., 
Legislation for the Needs of the Small Business, in B.A.K. Rider and M. Andenas 
(eds.), Developments in European Company Law Volume 2/1997: The Quest for an 
Ideal Legal Form for Small Businesses, (London: Kluwer Law International, 1999). 
An overview of the complex provisions and recent developments in the close 
corporation statutes of several European countries can be found in De Kluiver, H.J. 
and Van Gerven, W (eds.), The European Private Company?, (Antwerpen: MAKLU, 
1995). See also Centre for Law and Business, Faculty of Law, University of  
Manchester, Company Law in Europe: Recent Developments, A survey of recent 
developments in core principles of companies regulation in selected national systems 
(produced for the Department of Trade and Industry), (1999); Lutter, M., Limited 




                                                                                                                        
operation would exhaust the resources of SMEs entrepreneurs are left with the 
second-best choice of either forming a partnership or not starting up a business 
at all. As a result, even if traditional partnership law is considered ill-equipped to 
meet the contracting needs of entrepreneurs, some firms will nevertheless 
contract into this form due to over-optimism and overconfidence on behalf of the 
founders.18
Tax-enhancing qualities offer another explanation for the extensive use 
of traditional partnership forms. Some argue that tax considerations are the most 
important factor in choice-of-business-form decisions.19 The key feature of 
partnership tax treatment, often referred to as pass-through taxation or fiscal 
transparency, appears to play a pivotal role. In partnerships, income is generally 
treated as if it is the personal income of the partners, and is taxed accordingly.20 
In comparison to a corporation, in which income is first taxed to the corporation, 
and later, if the corporation’s after-tax income is paid as dividend, again to the 
shareholders as part of their income, partnership taxation could have two 
Organizations, International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 1998), vol. XIII chapter 2. For a representative survey regarding the US 
situation, see Wortman, T.J. (1995), Unlocking Lock-in: Limited Liability Companies 
and the Key to Underutilization of Close Corporation Statutes, New York University 
Law Review 70, (1995). 
18  See Cheffins, B.R. , Company Law: Theory, Structure, and Operation, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 66 (noting that individuals often start a small business in 
an atmosphere of heady optimism and mutual good-will, in part because the 
participants are often related or friends). See also Klein, W.A. and Coffee. J.C. Jr. 
(1996), Business Organization and Finance, Legal and Economic Principles, 
(Westbury: The Foundation Press, 1996), p. 64. 
19  See Erle, B., Besteuerung der Personengesellschaft Gewinnermittlung und laufende 
Besteuerung, in W. Müller and W-D Hoffmann (eds.), Beck’sches Handbuch der 
Personengesellschaften, (München: C.H. Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1999), §6; 
Blackett-Ord, M., Partnership, The modern law of trade, business and professional 
partnership in England and Wales, (London: Butterworths, 1997), pp. 526-527; 
Raaijmakers, M.J.G.C., Persoonsgebonden Samenwerkingsvormen en de 
‘Onderneming’ in het Privaatrecht, in M.J.G.C. Raaijmakers (ed.), 
Personenvennootschap en “onderneming”, (Deventer: W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, 1999), 
p. 1; Schmidt, K., Gesellschaftsrecht, (Köln: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1997), pp. 21-24. 
See also Endres, D., The New Tax Law and Corporate Structure Choices, EuroWatch 
13, (2001) (arguing that the recent changes in German tax law have reversed the 
choice of business organization forms in favour of the partnership form). 
20  Although partnership taxation is generally based on the assumption that a partnership 
is merely an aggregate of the individual partners, who reflect their share in the 
partnership in their own returns, jurisdictions use different bases for determining the 
partner’s income from the partnership. For instance, the taxable income may be 
determined at the partnership or partner level. See Daniels, A.H.M., Issues in 
International Partnership Taxation: with special reference to the United States, 
Germany, and the Netherlands, (Deventer: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 
1991), p. 46 (comparing the taxation of partnerships in the United States, Germany 




                                                
advantages. First, it allows the partners to offset deductible tax losses against 
other sources of income at the partners’ level. Second, the ‘double taxation’ 
effect could be avoided.21 In fact, most spousal and other family-owned firms are 
often formed as partnerships for these and other fringe tax benefits, such as tax-
qualified pension and retirement provisions.22 Allegedly, the tax-shelter 
capabilities of partnerships are also largely responsible for the use of the form 
for joint ventures and the relative success of limited partnerships as financing 
devices.  
It follows from the above discussion that the use of traditional 
partnership forms is attributable mainly to their flexibility and informality, and, 
most importantly, to their tax benefits. Traditional partnership forms have 
always covered informal and temporary ventures of the smallest scope, as well 
as very complicated tax-driven operations. However, as soon as the tax benefits 
dissipate and legal advisors are involved, firms are urged to organize or re-
organize in the corporate form.  
Given the importance of tax considerations in choosing a business form, 
the possible uncertainty about the tax authorities’ reaction to revisions to 
partnership law and the introduction of new partnership-type forms is yet 
another important source of legal stasis. The fact that both commentators and 
practitioners tend to characterize partnership forms as artifacts of tax law could 
very well impede the evolution of partnership law.23 Apparently, amendments in 
business form statutes are often suggested to reflect changes created by tax 
regulations.24 In the main, lawmakers are inclined to take for granted rigid and 
 
21  It must be noted, however, that whilst it is clear that partnerships in the United States 
have major tax advantages, the tax position in other jurisdictions is to some extent 
different. Due to the availability of tax credits for shareholders on dividends and more 
favourable corporate tax rates, double taxation on corporate profits is not experienced 
to the same extent in Europe. See, e.g., Freedman, J., Limited Liability Partnerships in 
the UK – Do They Have a Role for Small Firms?, Journal of Corporation Law 26, 
(2001),p. 914 (comparing the United Kingdom with the United States). 
22  See Blackett-Ord, M., Partnership, The modern law of trade, business and professional 
partnership in England and Wales, (London: Butterworths, 1997), p. 532; Bromberg, 
A.R. and Ribstein, L.E., Bromberg and Ribstein on Partnership, (New York: Aspen 
Law and Business, 1999), §2.10; Freedman J. and Ward, J., Taxation of Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises, European Taxation 40, (2000), pp. 159 and 172-173; 
Mohr, A.L. (1998), Van Maatschap, Vennootschap Onder Firma en Commanditaire 
Vennootschap, (Deventer: Gouda Quint, 1998), pp. 198-207. 
23  Cf. Ribstein, L.E., Statutory Forms for Closely Held Firms: Theories and Evidence 
from LLCs, Washington University Law Quaterly 73, (1995), p. 371 (noting that 
lawyers tend to assume that statutory business forms are artifacts of tax law, and often 
fail to acknowledge transaction cost justifications for statutory business forms). 
24  See, e.g., Stara, N.J., Has The Uniform Partnership Act Been Superseded by 
Subchapter K?, Drake Law Review 41, (1992) (arguing that the US Uniform 




                                                                                                                        
awkward rules that are unsuited to the operation of small and medium-sized 
firms. In their tax-influenced view, they assume that legal rules are trivial, in the 
sense that business partners could easily neutralize sub-optimal statutory 
provisions by making contractual adjustments. Nevertheless, this assumption of 
triviality may not hold.25 As we will see in the next section, closely held business 
forms are likely to enter into a period of rapid and substantial change in Europe, 
as recently experienced in the United States.26 Arguably, if the law were trivial, 
reform-minded lawmakers and interest groups would not encourage its reform. 
More importantly, current law and finance scholarship suggests that legal rules 
such as disclosure requirements and investor protection have a significant impact 
on firms’ growth.27 While the literature mainly focuses on publicly held firms, it 
also lends support to the view that the legal environment may have important 
influences on the development of closely held firms. 
In the United States, taxation of partnership-type business forms was governed by the 
‘Kintner regulations’ for many years. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) used to 
look to four factors in determining when an entity should be deemed ‘an association 
taxable as a corporation’: (1) freedom from personal liability, (2) centralized 
management, (3) free transferability of interests, and (4) continuity of life. If a firm 
had more than two of these characteristics, it was taxed as a corporation. See Treas. 
Reg. §301.7701-2(a)(1). The ‘Kintner regulations’ resulted in so-called ‘bullet-proof’ 
business form statutes, which contained mandatory rules so as to ascertain partnership 
tax treatment. See Hamilton, R.W., Business Organizations, Unincorporated 
Businesses and Closely Held Corporations Essential Terms and Concepts, (New 
York: Aspen Law and Business, 1996), p. 124; Humphreys, Th.A, Limited Liability 
Companies, (New York: Law Journal Seminars-Press, 1998), §1.03; Hynes, J.D., 
Agency, Partnership, and the LLC, The Law of Unincorporated Business Enterprises, 
Cases, Materials, Problems, (Charlottesville: Lexis Law Publishing, 1998), p. 439. For 
another US example regarding estate and gift tax rules, see Miller, S.K., What Buy-out 
Rights, Fiduciary Duties, and Dissolution Remedies Should Apply in the Case of the 
Minority Owner of a Limited Liability Company?, Harvard Journal on Legislation 38, 
(2001), pp. 413-415 (arguing that changes in fundamental rights should not be driven 
by purely tax considerations).  
25  Cf. Black, B., Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 
Northwestern University Law Review 84, (1990) (arguing that mandatory rules in 
corporate law may be trivial to the extent that they are market-mimicking, avoidable, 
changeable or unimportant). 
26  Cf. West, M.D., The Puzzling Divergence of Corporate Law: Evidence and 
Explanations from Japan and the United States, University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 150, (2001), p. 531 (suggesting that legal change presents a great challenge to 
the triviality thesis). 
27  See La Porta, R. et al, Legal Detrminants of External Finance, Journal of Finance 52, 
(1997); La Porta, R. et al, Law and Finance, Journal of Political Economy 106, 
(1998); La Porta, R. et al, Corporate Ownership Around the World, Journal of 
Finance 54, (1999); Gonzáles, N.U., Legal Environment, Capital Structure and Firm 
Growth: International Evidence from Industry Data, Working Paper February 2002. 
Cf. Coase, R.H., The Institutional Structure of Production, American Economic 
Review 82, (1992), pp. 717-718 (noting that the legal system has a profound effect on 




                                                
 
 
2 THE GENESIS OF ‘NEW PARTNERSHIP LAW’ 
 
2.1 The ‘Partnership Analogy’ in Corporate Law  
 
The economic role of SMEs has given a fresh impetus to business organization 
law reforms.28 Over the past decade, SMEs, and particularly high-tech firms, 
have attracted increased attention in recognition of their major employment-
generating abilities and their contribution to innovation and economic growth. 
Since they are regarded as the backbone of a robust economy, bolstering a 
regulatory and business environment conducive to their development is at the 
top of the political agendas of industrialized countries.29 Policymakers have 
become aware that neglecting the organizational needs of these firms will stunt 
productivity growth and job creation. The rapid pace of technological change 
and the decreasing international barriers to trade over the past decade have not 
only created new strategic and organizational opportunities for SMEs, but have 
also made these enterprises more vulnerable to risks.30 Hence, it is submitted that 
in order to help SMEs fully exploit these new opportunities and adjust more 
 
28  According to the OECD, Small and Medium Enterprise Outlook, Enterprise, Industry 
and Services, (2000), small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are non-subsidiary, 
independent firms that employ fewer than a given number of employees. In the 
European Union, this number is 250, while the United States considers SMEs to 
include firms with fewer than 500 workers. Small firms employ fewer than 50 
employees. Micro-enterprises have at most 10 employees. In Europe, 93% of the 
businesses are micro-enterprises. In the United States, this percentage is 50. The 
OECD report indicates that the average firm size in OECD countries is in fact 
declining. 
29  See OECD , Small and Medium Enterprise Outlook, Enterprise, Industry and 
Services,  (2000); OECD, The New Economy: Beyond the Hype, Final Report on the 
OECD Growth Project, (2001). See also European Commission, Green Paper on 
Innovation, (1995); European Commission, Risk Capital: A Key to Job Creation in the 
European Union European Commission, (1998); European Commission , The 
Competitiveness of European Enterprises in the Face of Globalisation – How it can be 
encouraged, COM(98) 718 final, Brussels, 20.01.1999; European Commission, 
Challenges for enterprise policy in the knowledge-driven economy, Proposal for a 
Council Decision on a Multiannual Programme for Enterprise and Entrepreneurship 
(2001-2005), COM(2000) 256 final/2, Brussels, 11.5.2000. 
30  Cf. Sakai, K., Global Industrial Restructuring: Implications for Small Firms, OECD 
Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry, STI Working Papers 2002/4, p. 5 
(‘[t]he degree of globalization of SMEs differs significantly by sector, reflecting the 
fact that they consist of a diverse and heterogeneous set of firms. While small firms in 
traditional services still predominantly serve local markets, some, especially 
knowledge-based small firms, have been particularly active in cross-border strategic 




                                                
easily to immediate uncertainty, policymakers at both a national and 
international level should endeavour to devise the most competitive and efficient 
legal business forms as part of the ‘intangible infrastructure’ intended to foster 
investment, innovation and entrepreneurship.31 Of course, business organization 
law is only one of the determinants of start-up decisions. There is little doubt 
that the main considerations affecting these decisions are operational and macro-
economic.32 Nevertheless, in the age of globalization, the pattern of business 
start-ups is likely to be increasingly sensitive to business organization law. 
Competitive legal business forms must allow SMEs to ideally match their legal 
status with their organizational needs, giving them the opportunity to start, grow 
and develop in the context of a highly competitive business environment.33  
While scholars have debated the advantages of the corporate form for 
small and medium-sized businesses, the discussion of competition-based 
lawmaking for this type of business form represents a new departure. Given the 
presence of market-driven pressures, monopolistic regulators are being forced to 
make changes to their legal regimes. In their quest for ideal business 
organization law, the lawmaking elite focuses predominantly on close 
corporation law. The main thrust of these reform efforts has been to break down 
the traditional rigidities and formalities inherited from the publicly held 
corporation.34 Regardless of whether they are governed by a separate statute (the 
 
31  Rapid technological change and increased global competition put pressure on 
governments to make their intangible and physical infrastructures more efficient so as 
to stimulate entrepreneurship. In this context, ‘intangible infrastructure’ means the 
regulatory system that fosters the development of SMEs. ‘Physical infrastructure’ 
alludes to (among other things) the communication and transportation systems 
available, such as roads, cables, and so on. The urge to reform regulations that could 
discourage the creation and expansion of SMEs could not only be ascribed to 
indigenous exigencies, but also to the desire to attract foreign investment and business 
activity. See Wilf, S., Creating the Next Silicon Valley, Hartford Courant, 2 February 
2001; Cf. Ferran, E., Company Law Reform in the UK, Working Paper Ferran (2001), 
p. 1. 
32  Cf. DTI, the UK Consultation Document from the Company Law Review Steering 
Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy, The Strategic Framework 
, (1999), p. 96. 
33  Cf. Ferran, E., Company Law Reform in the UK, Working Paper, (2001), p.  2 (‘whilst 
company law on its own may be relatively insignificant, it is appropriate to look at the 
reform of company law in the context of a bigger package of regulatory reform 
initiatives in the UK. This package is intended to provide incentives for business 
activity and investment that will, in the government’s view, have a significant 
cumulative impact on productivity and economic growth.’). 
34  See, e.g., DTI, the UK Consultation Document from the Company Law Review 
Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy, The Strategic 
Framework, (1999), pp. 56-69. Cf. Bachmann, G., Grundtendenzen der Reform 
geschlossener Gesellschaften in Europa, Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und 




                                                                                                                        
‘free standing approach’) or viewed as factual variations on or sub-type of the 
general corporation (the ‘integrated approach’),35 close corporations have 
developed in the image of the large publicly held corporation with its capital-
oriented structure.36  
Court of Justice (Case C-212/97 Centros Ltd v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstryelsen [1999] 
ECR I-1459) could give an important impetus to close corporation law reform in 
Germany); Ferran, E., Company Law Reform in the UK, Working Paper, (2001), pp. 9 
and 11 (observing that even though the United Kingdom has low barriers to 
entrepreneurship in comparison with other European countries, encouraging the 
creation and expansion of small firms and innovative start-ups is high on the political 
agenda in the UK); Freedman, J., The Quest for an Ideal Form for Small Businesses – 
A Misconceived Enterprise?, in B.A.K. Rider and M. Andenas (eds.), Developments 
in European Company Law Volume 2/1997: The Quest for an Ideal Legal Form for 
Small Businesses, (London: Kluwer Law International, 1999), p. 29 (discussing the 
story of statutory audit exemption for SMEs in the United Kingdom); Sinha, A, A 
Modern Corporate Revolution for Small Private Companies, International Company 
and Commercial Law Review, (2002) (noting that the DTI’s Company Law Steering 
Group core proposals aim to simplify and modernize the law for small businesses). 
35  In the United Kingdom and the United States, the closely held and publicly held 
corporation have a single legislative base. However, it is argued that the distinction 
between these two business organization forms is becoming clearer. See Bachmann, 
G., Grundtendenzen der Reform geschlossener Gesellschaften in Europa, Zeitschrift 
für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht (ZGR) 30, (2001). See also Centre for Law 
and Business, Faculty of Law, University of Manchester, Company Law in Europe: 
Recent Developments, A survey of recent developments in core principles of 
companies regulation in selected national systems (produced for the Department of 
Trade and Industry), p. 3 (enumerating the European countries that have a single 
legislative base and countries that follow the pattern of formal and distinct regulatory 
regimes). Many European jurisdictions have a separate close corporation statute. For 
instance, the German Limited Liability Company (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter 
Haftung) is governed by a separate statute. See Volhard, R. and Stengel, A., German 
Limited Liability Company, (West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 1997), pp. 6-8. 
Because most national legislatures in Europe voluntarily apply the EU directives on 
publicly held corporations to their closely held counterpart (‘implicit linkage’), it 
might nevertheless be argued that an integrated approach prevails. 
36  See Carney, W.J., Limited Liability Companies: Origins and Antecedents, University 
of Colorado Law Review 66, (1995), pp. 863-867; Lutter, M, Limited Liability 
Companies and Private Companies, in D. Vagts (ed.), Business and Private 
Organizations, International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 1998), Vol. XIII Chapter 2, pp. 3-12; Wymeersch, E., Company Law in 
Europe and European Company Law, Gent Working Paper Series, (2001), p. 6. See 
also Wouters, J., European Company Law: Quo Vadis?, Common Market Law 
Review 37, (2000), pp. 263-265 (noting that most national legislatures in Europe have 
voluntarily applied the EU directives on publicly held corporations to the closely held 
corporate form). Under EU law, mandatory rules are designed to protect third parties 
from externalities. They are also intended to protect contracting parties that face 
strategic or information problems that would prevent them from reaching optimal 
contracts. There has been a fear that the mandatory rules ensuing from centralized 
efforts to unify publicly held corporations (‘top-down harmonization’) would lead to a 
loss of coherence in national corporate law. However, according to Wouters, this fear 
seems to be partly compensated by the directives’ spillover effects, i.e., by the extent 




                                                
To the extent that jurisdictions have had few revenue-based incentives to 
research and design the optimal rules for SMEs, they have attempted to apply 
the governance structure and mandatory provisions designed for publicly held 
corporations to their closely held counterparts.37 Since this governance structure 
is designed to attract substantial amounts of capital into the firm from passive 
investors and, consequently, to regulate a rich and intricate set of agency 
relationships, corporation law is poorly tailored to fit the governance needs of 
smaller firms, in which ownership and control are typically not completely 
severed.38 Despite the inappropriateness of the corporate law governance rules, 
the corporation has nevertheless become the preferred vehicle for business 
organization among SMEs wishing to take advantage of several corporate 
features, such as limited liability and continuity of life.39 Naturally, the impetus 
 
37  It is argued that European policymakers and legislatures underestimated the 
importance of small businesses in the growth period of the after-war years. See 
Moussis, N., Small and Medium Enterprises in the Internal Market, European Law 
Review 17, (1992), p. 484. In the United States, the legislature’s focus on attracting 
large corporate charters has left the law governing closely held business forms as 
somewhat of a backwater. See Ayres, I., Judging Close Corporations in the Age of 
Statutes, Washington University Law Quaterly 70, (1992), pp. 372-373. 
38  In the context of publicly held corporations, a set of legal rules is intended to align the 
interests of the managers with those of the passive investors. In this respect, legal 
rules and corporate governance structures are important as a means of reducing the 
agency costs imposed by managers acting in their own interests to the detriment of 
shareholders, mainly in firms owned by dispersed ownership. See Scott, K.E., Agency 
Costs and Corporate Governance, in P. Newman (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary 
of Economics and the Law, (London: Macmillan Reference Limited, 1998), Vol. 1, 
pp. 26-27. Please note that the economic theory of agency, to which the corporate 
governance issue refers, should be distinguished from the legal concept of agency. See 
Cheffins, B.R., Company Law: Theory, Structure, and Operation, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997), p. 45. 
39  See Lutter, M, Limited Liability Companies and Private Companies, in D. Vagts (ed.), 
Business and Private Organizations, International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998), Vol. XIII Chapter 2, p. 182 (calling the close 
corporation the most successful business form in the world). In 2001 approximately 
850,000 firms were organized as close corporations in Germany. See Hansen, H., Die 
GmbH als weiterhin umsatzstärkste Rechtsform, Anzahl der GmbH beträgt Ende 2001 
ca. 850 000, GmbHRundschau 93, (2002); Meyer, J., Die GmbH und andere 
Handelsgesellschaften im Spiegel empirischer Forschung (I) and (II), 
GmbHRundschau 93, (2002), p. 188 (arguing that popularity of the close corporation 
is still increasing in Germany). In the United Kingdom, this number was more than 1 
million. Several empirical projects show that limited liability and tax considerations 
are the most important reasons to incorporate in the United Kingdom. See, e.g., 
Freedman, J. and Godwin, M., Incorporating the micro business: perceptions and 
misperceptions, in A. Hughes and D.J. Storey (eds.), Finance and the Small Firm, 
(London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 245-247; Hicks, A. et al, Alternative Company 
Structures for the Small Business, commissioned and published by The Chartered 
Association of Certified Accountants, (London: Certified Accountants Educational 




                                                
to incorporate increases when becoming a corporation provides tax benefits. 
Moreover, incorporation is often prompted by lawyers and accountants who tend 
to shy away from the task of drafting a partnership agreement. Even though they 
usually have standard contractual forms at their disposal, they seem to feel more 
comfortable forming a corporation. In view of learning effects, this is 
understandable, but may be inefficient since it involves more formality and 
higher costs.40
The current debate on the regulation of close corporations can be 
explained in terms of a trade-off between the need for creditor and minority 
shareholder protection,41 in case of firm failure, and the commitment to supply 
legal rules, which gives firm participants the ability to maximize wealth. In order 
to meet the needs of the specialized and idiosyncratic relationships in close 
corporations, legislative and (more importantly) judicial adaptations and 
additions to the analogy of partnership law have been made in a piecemeal 
fashion across jurisdictions through the years. For instance, in the United States 
and Germany, the judiciary has recognized that shareholders in a close 
corporation setting may owe each other a strict fiduciary duty of good faith and 
loyalty.42 In the Netherlands, the Dutch Supreme Court articulated strict 
restrictions on interest transfer for shareholders of close corporations, based on 
enhanced good faith and fiduciary duties, where the articles of incorporation did 
not explicitly address these matters.43 Finally, in Ebrahami v Westbourne 
 
40  It might be argued that corporate law statutes have generated learning and network 
benefits, such as judicial precedents, customs and practices which tend to confine 
lawyers to a more passive role. There appears to be a prevailing belief that 
corporations are simpler and less expensive to organize than partnership-type business 
forms. See Keatinge, R.R., Corporations, Unincorporated Organizations, and 
Unincorporations: Check the Box and the Balkanization of Business Organizations, 
Journal of Small and Emerging Business Law 1, (1997), p. 203. 
41  The principle of centralized control and majority rule in combination with the lack of 
a public market for shares in a close corporation leave a minority shareholder 
vulnerable in a way that is distinct from the risk faced by shareholders of a public 
corporation. 
42  See Donahue v Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975) and, to a lesser 
extent, Wilkes v Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976). In 
Germany, the German Supreme Court imposed a broad fiduciary duty on controlling 
shareholders of the German close corporation – Gesellschaft mit beschränkter 
Haftung (GmbH) – in the ITT case (BGH 5 June 1975, BGHZ 65, 15 (ITT). For an 
analysis on the development of case law regarding fiduciary duties, see Pistor, K. and 
Xu C., Fiduciary Duty in Transitional Civil Law Jurisdictions, Lessons from the 
Incomplete Law Theory, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Law 
Working Paper No. 01/2002, pp. 28-32. 
43  See Hoge Raad, 31 December 1993, (1994) NJ, 436. See also Raaijmakers, M.J.G.C., 





                                                
Galleries,44 the House of Lords decided that circumstances in which a UK 
private company is in essence a quasi-partnership (formed and continued by 
individuals who were essentially partners but who had chosen the legal 
mechanism of a corporate structure for its obvious advantages) justify the 
application of partnership just and equitable winding-up principles.45 In short, 
the application of automatic dissolution and buy-out rights, strict precepts of 
fiduciary duty and good faith to protect shareholders, the authorization of strict 
share transfer restrictions, and contractual flexibility to modify and sidestep rigid 
rules characterize the close corporation form as a ‘quasi-partnership’, 
‘incorporated partnership’, or ‘partnership corporation’.46  
While many commentators view the ‘mom and pop’ firm as being the 
archetypical close corporation, others point to a wider range of closely held 
firms that employ the corporate form, such as high-tech operations backed by 
sophisticated outside investors.47 They argue that although the traditional close 
 
44  [1973] AC 360 (HL). 
45  See Cheffins, B.R., Company Law: Theory, Structure, and Operation, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 292-293; Rider, B.A.K., Partnership Law and Its Impact 
on “Domestic Companies”, Cambridge Law Journal 38, (1979), pp. 161-176. See also 
Acton, S., Just and equitable winding up: the strange case of the disappearing 
jurisdiction, Company Lawyer 22, (2001), pp. 135-136 (arguing that the decision in 
Re Guidezone Ltd., [2000] 2 B.C.L.C. 321, Ch D., which held that the just and 
equitable winding-up jurisdiction was no wider than the jurisdiction under section 459 
of the Companies Act 1985, is wrong). 
46  See, e.g., Thompson, R.B., The Shareholder’s Cause of Action for Oppression, 
Business Lawyer 48, (1993), pp. 704-706 (explaining that legislatures and courts in 
the United States have modified close corporation law in at least five areas: 
governance structure, share transfer restrictions, contractual flexibility, the use of 
involuntary dissolution statutes, and enhanced fiduciary duties). In other jurisdictions, 
these strategies have not been developed to same extent as in the United States. See 
Lutter, M, Limited Liability Companies and Private Companies, in D. Vagts (ed.), 
Business and Private Organizations, International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998), Vol. XIII Chapter 2, pp. 94-99 (recognizing the 
importance of the partnership analogy, but admitting that solutions appear to be 
haphazard and ad hoc rather than systematic). That the majority of close corporations 
usually have less than four shareholders tends to support the partnership metaphor. 
See, e.g., Gomes, A. and Novaes, W., Sharing Control as a Corporate Governance 
Mechanism, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Institute for Law and Economics 
Research Paper No. 01-12, (2001), pp. 25-27 (referring to empirical data in the US, 
which shows that, even though the average number of shareholders was 74.4 in 1992, 
the median was only 3.0); Meyer (2002: 180 and 243) (noting that approximately 80% 
of the closely held firms that use the GmbH form have one or two shareholders). 
47  Certainly, the members of small firms are usually part of the management team. See, 
e.g., Hicks, A. et al, Alternative Company Structures for the Small Business, 
commissioned and published by The Chartered Association of Certified Accountants, 
(London: Certified Accountants Educational Trust, 1995), pp. 13-14 (showing that 
small companies are not being used as a vehicle to attract outside capital from passive 
investors). However, many closely held firms are financed by debt and venture 




                                                                                                                        
corporation does not meet the needs of the typical small firm, its structure is 
especially well-suited to high-tech firms, which are characterized by a high 
proportion of ‘match-specific assets’.48 In their view, it is more efficient to 
expand the menu of business forms so as to allow the close corporation to 
maintain its distinctive qualities. 
There is something to the expansion of business forms. Because it is not 
yet clear when and to what extent the partnership principles should be applied to 
close corporations, the ‘partnership law’ analogy is full of perils and pitfalls.49 
For instance, it is not always possible to effectively draft around the statutory 
provisions of corporate statutes, in that the contractual variations may not always 
be fully enforced.50 This is especially true when a contract between shareholders 
Easterbrook, F.H. and Fischel D.R., The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991), p. 228; Rock,, 
E.B. and Wachter, M.L., Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match-specific Assets and 
Minority Oppression in Close Corporations, Journal of Corporation Law 24, (1999), 
pp. 913-914. 
48  See Rock,, E.B. and Wachter, M.L., Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match-specific 
Assets and Minority Oppression in Close Corporations, Journal of Corporation Law 
24, (1999) (explaining that the closely held structure encourages the investment of 
‘match-specific assets’, i.e., assets that have a value to the parties to the venture but 
little value to outsiders); Stevenson, S.W. , The Venture Capital Solution to the 
Problem of Close Corporation Shareholder Fiduciary Duties, Duke Law Journal 51, 
(2001) (arguing that experiments in the laboratory of venture capital contracting show 
that courts should be reluctant to impose broad fiduciary duties on minority 
shareholders). The survival capacity of high-tech close corporations lends empirical 
support to Rock and Wachters’ thesis. Cf. Hampe, J. and Steininger, M., Survival, 
Growth, and Interfirm Collaboration of Start-Up Companies in High-Technology 
Industries: A Case Study of Upper Bavaria. Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) 
Discussion Paper No. 345, (2001), pp.  9, 13, and 22 (noting that empirical research 
indicates ‘a clearly higher probability of survival of the legal form limited liability 
company (GmbH) in comparison to companies of all other legal forms’). 
49  Cf. DTI, the UK Consultation Document from the Company Law Review Steering 
Group, Modern Company Law For a Competitive Economy, Final Report DTI (2001), 
pp. 33 and 163-164 (arguing that limiting the unfair prejudice claim under section 459 
of the Companies Act 1985 (see O’Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 W.L.R. 1092) will 
discourage the practice of making all manner of allegations which might conceivably 
sustain a case of unfairness). See also Blaiklock, A.R.M., Fiduciary Duties Owed by 
Frozen-out Minority Shareholders in Close Corporations, Indiana Law Review 30, 
(1997), pp. 766-767 (noting that criticism has arisen in the United States as to the 
scope and applicability of the partnership analogy).  
50  See, e.g., Hochstetler, W.S. and Svejda, M.D., Statutory Needs of Close Corporations 
– An Empirical Study: Special Close Corporation Legislation or Flexible General 
Corporation Law?, Journal of Corporation Law 10, (1985), pp. 918-919 
(‘[o]rganizing the close corporation as a partnership, however, runs counter to the idea 
expressed in some judicial opinions that a close corporation must be run like a 
publicly held corporation – not as a partnership. Corporations cannot revert to 
partnership practices in the management of the business whenever they so desire. 
Thus, courts’ decisions have invalidated partnership arrangements in close 




                                                                                                                        
conflicts with the close corporation’s articles of association and bylaws. The fact 
that many closely held firms are unlikely to adjust statutory corporate rules,51 
leaving dispute resolution to rest solely on judicial discretion in applying vague 
legal standards of good faith and fiduciary duties, reinforces critics’ view of the 
partnership metaphor. The judicial discretion to meddle in the internal affairs of 
close corporations might entail deficiencies and inconsistencies, in that the 
firm’s participants (e.g., the investors and creditors) might no longer be able to 
rely on the business form they deal with.52 Judicial interpretation, especially 
when it stands apart from the statute itself, could limit the statute’s certainty and 
its value for both public and closely held firms.53 Furthermore, it appears that, 
once partnership-type doctrines are accepted in the close corporation context, 
these doctrines are difficult to opt out of.54 Finally, because these doctrines are 
vague and open-ended, they may create confusion, thereby preventing the 
formation of firms, international joint ventures in particular.55 There is therefore 
parties cannot be partners as between themselves, and a corporation as to the rest of 
the world. A corporation cannot serve as the mere instrumentality of a partnership 
because a corporation is a distinct type of business organization and its characteristics 
cannot be mingled with those of a partnership.’). See also Lutter, M, Limited Liability 
Companies and Private Companies, in D. Vagts (ed.), Business and Private 
Organizations, International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 1998), Vol. XIII Chapter 2, pp. 94-99. 
51  It appears that departures from statutory rules raise procedural and psychological 
barriers. See DTI, the UK Consultation Document from the Company Law Review 
Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy, The Strategic 
Framework DTI, (1999), pp. 56-57. 
52  See, e.g., O’Kelley, Ch. R. Jr., Opting in and out of Fiduciary Duties in Cooperative 
Ventures: Refining the So-called Coasean Contract Theory, Washington University 
Law Quaterly 70, (1992), pp: 357 fn 16 (arguing that efficiency-minded judges must 
weigh the potential gains from correcting for irrational form selection against the costs 
in form devaluation resulting from such erroneous second guessing). Cf. Cheffins, 
B.R., Company Law: Theory, Structure, and Operation, (Oxford: Clarendon Press 
Cheffins, 1997), p. 333 (explaining that despite the approach English courts take to 
precedent and despite the division of labour within the High Court, the predictability 
of company law is undermined in some measures). 
53  See, e.g., Ayres, I., Judging Close Corporations in the Age of Statutes, Washington 
University Law Quaterly 70, (1992), pp. 387-388. 
54  See Oesterle, D.A., Subcurrents in LLC Statutes: Limiting the Discretion of State 
Courts to Restructure the Internal Affairs of Small Business, University of Colorado 
Law Review 66, (1995), p. 888 (discussing three doctrines that courts in the United 
States have used so as to protect the minority shareholder in close corporations). 
55  See Miller, S.K., Minority Shareholder Oppression in the Private Company in the 
European Community: A Comparative Analysis of the German, United Kingdom, and 
French “Close Corporation Problem”, Cornell International Law Journal 30, (1997), 
p. 427 (arguing that vague legal concepts regarding shareholder misconduct may 
increase rather than reduce the international shareholder’s confusion regarding the 




                                                
a prima facie case for partnership law reform and the development of new 
partnership-type business forms. In order to enhance certainty and efficiency, 
new business forms should recognize the diversity of closely held firms. 
 
 
2.2 The Need for New Partnership-type Business Forms 
 
Notwithstanding the increased popularity of the partnership analogy, lawmakers 
acknowledge that the corporate form alone is not equal to the task of serving all 
types of closely held firms.56 Converting the close corporation into an 
incorporated partnership by codifying numerous judicial opinions would 
certainly better meet the needs of the vast majority of small firms. However, to 
some extent it could act as a barrier to growth for firms wishing to expand and to 





In an era in which the average firm size is decreasing,57 some are 
therefore pointing to the importance of partnership law reform.58 In this view, 
 
56  See, e.g., Faber, D., Foreword, in B.A.K. Rider and M. Andenas (eds.), Developments 
in European Company Law Volume 2/1997: The Quest for an Ideal Legal Form for 
Small Businesses, London: Kluwer Law International, (1999), p. v (arguing that there 
is no ideal legal form for small businesses); Freedman, J., Small Businesses and the 
Corporate Form: Burden or Privilege?, Modern Law Review 57, (1994), p. 580 
(using the Australian experience to illustrate the impossibility of formulating a simple 
statute that would cater for small business generally). 
57  See OECD, Small and Medium Enterprise Outlook, Enterprise, Industry and Services 
OECD, (2000) p. 8. 
58  Recently, partnership law has increasingly attracted attention across jurisdictions. The 
United Kingdom: DTI, Company Law Review: The Law Applicable to Private 
Companies (URN 94/529), (1994); Law Commission (Law Commission for England 
and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission), Partnership Law, A Joint Consultation 
Paper (2000); Deards, E., Partnership Law in the Twenty-first Century, Journal of 
Business Law 2001. Germany: Gustavus, E., Die Neuregelungen im 
Gesellschaftsrecht nach dem Regierungsentwurf eines Handelsrechtsreformgesetzes, 
GmbHRundschau 89, (1998); Kögel, S., Entwurf eines Handelsrechtsreformgesetzes, 
Betriebs-Berater 52, (1997); Krebs, P., Reform oder Revolution? – Zum 
Referentenentwurf eines Handelsrechtsreformgesetzes, Der Betrieb 1996; Schmidt, 
K., HGB-Reform und gesellschaftsrechtliche Gestaltungspraxis, Der Betrieb 1998. 
The Netherlands: Maeijer, J.M.M., Memorandum with respect to the bill regarding the 
(personal) partnership ((persoonlijke) vennootschap): title 7.13 of the New Civil Code 
(NBW), (1998). The United States: NCCUSL, Uniform Limited Partnership Act), 
NCCUSL, (2001); UPA Revision Subcommittee of the ABA Partnership Committee, 
Corporate Banking and Business Law Section, Should the Uniform Partnership Act be 




                                                                                                                        
traditional partnership laws are inappropriate in the current business climate, 
characterized by closer economic integration and consumerism. The reform 
debates, which are heralded as providing the essential conditions for innovative 
change, focus primarily on the nature of the partnership as a separate legal 
personality, thereby encouraging the stability and continuity of the partnership 
form. Paradoxically, reformers are moving partnership law further in the 
direction of corporate law. 
More significant than straightforward partnership law reform, traditional 
partnership forms have been reworked and mutated into successful new 
partnership-type business forms in the United States.59 The creation of these new 
business forms, ironically often carried out independent of traditional 
partnership law reform, appears to be based on a compelling logic. Expanding 
the menu of business forms is essential to meet the complex needs of a variety of 
modern closely held firms. For instance, the introduction of the Limited Liability 
Company (LLC), the Limited Liability Partnership (LLP) and the Limited 
Liability Limited Partnership (LLLP) in the United States allows closely held 
firms to access limited liability by means of a perfunctory filing, reduce 
complexity and limit transaction costs, resulting in more capital being available 
for the actual operations of the business. Evidence from the United States also 
shows that the introduction of new business forms provides the necessary 
impetus to help erode antiquated tax and burdensome mandatory legal rules.60
In Europe, the introduction of new partnership-type business forms is 
also on the policy agenda. The policy debate in the United Kingdom, for 
instance, has centered on the problems of easy availability of limited liability for 
Partnership Act Midstream: Major Policy Decisions, University of Toledo Law 
Review 21, (1990); Weidner, D.J. and Larson, J.W., The Revised Uniform Partnership 
Act: The Reporters’ Overview, Business Lawyer 49, (1993); ULA, Business and 
Nonprofit Organizations and Associations Laws, (St. Paul: West Publishing Co, 
1995), Volume 6. Europe: European Commission . White Paper on growth, 
competitiveness, and employment: The challenges and ways forward into the 21st 
century, COM(1993) 700 final; European Commission , Recommendation 94/1069 on 
the transfer of small and medium-sized enterprises, OJ 1994 L.384; European 
Commission, Communication from the Commission on The transfer of small and 
medium-sized enterprises, OJ 1998 C 93. 
59  See, e.g., Callison, J.W. and Vestal, A.W., “They’ve Created A Lamb With Mandibles 
of Death”: Secrecy, Disclosure, and Fiduciary Duties in Limited Liability Firms, 
Indiana Law Journal 76, (2001), pp. 271-273; Vestal, A.W., “… Drawing Near the 
Fastness?” The Failed United States Experiment in Unincorporated Business Entity 
Reform, Journal of Corporation Law 26, (2001), p. 1019. 
60  See, e.g., Ribstein, L.E., The Evolving Partnership, Journal of Corporation Law 26, 
(2001), pp. 828-830 (arguing that horizontal competition among states and vertical 





                                                
small businesses.61 Given the apparent success of the new vehicles in the United 
States, UK lawmakers have recently introduced legislation allowing firms to 
organize as an LLP. By making the best of both worlds available cheaply to 
SMEs, policymakers help to level the playing field between large multinational 
businesses and their small and informal counterparts. Arguably, business forms 
which offer a favourable tax treatment, partnership-type ease of operation and 
flexibility, and limited liability with a minimum of ‘red tape’ are most important 
at a time when SMEs are facing increased risks to starting and operating a 
venture.62 This is especially true of high-growth small firms, which play a 
pivotal role in both innovation and economic growth. Obviously, the 
combination of partnership and corporate benefits, which make cheaply 
available separation of personal assets and life from the business venture are 
important to facilitate the often-necessary private equity financing.63 Due to high 
asset input and uncertain valuations, the risks can be substantial in high-growth 
start-ups. For instance, venture capitalists invest large stakes in entrepreneurs, 
whose abilities are often difficult to evaluate. Accordingly, given the high 
probability of conflict between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur, the 
former finds it necessary to both monitor and bond the entrepreneur so as to 
reduce the agency costs that occur throughout the venture capital cycle. The 
absence of complete risk diversification and an active market for control holds 
out the potential for greater risk and reinforces the demand for high-level 
 
61  See Freedman, J., Limited Liability: Large Company Theory and Small Firms, 
Modern Law Review 63, (2000), p. 317. 
62  Obviously, numerous legal requirements for starting to operate a business, combined 
with the time it takes to meet them, can act as a disincentive for entrepreneurs to take 
up the risk of creating a new business. See, e.g., European Commission, Risk Capital: 
A Key to Job Creation in the European Union, (1998), pp. 17-19. A study of the 
regulation of entry in 75 countries of the world shows that, even aside from the costs 
associated with corruption and bureaucratic delay, legal entry is extremely expensive 
in the vast majority of countries around the world. Since heavier regulation of entry 
does not appear to be associated with measures of better quality of private or public 
goods, the principal beneficiaries, if any, appear to be the politicians and the 
bureaucrats themselves. See Djankov, S. et al, The Regulation of Entry, Harvard 
Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 1904, (2000). 
63  Venture capital is often the only source of investment for entrepreneurs. See 
Keuschnigg, C. and Nielsen, S.B., Public Policy for Venture Capital, Center for 
Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research (CESifo) Working Paper 
No. 486, (2001), p. 2 (‘Lacking the required financial resources, entrepreneurs must 
usually rely on outside finance to start up a company. Unfortunately, outside 
financiers find it difficult to evaluate projects with acceptable reliability since the 
technological feasibility and commercial potential of new ventures are largely 
unknown. While many essential features of the project are known to the entrepreneur, 
he cannot credibly communicate them to outside financiers. Loans cannot be secured 
due to lack of collateral. Neither is their any past record that might help to gauge the 




                                                
contractual mechanisms. Since changed economic conditions often entail the 
need for new contractual regimes,64 a business form which offers a staggering 
degree of freedom to design the relationship between entrepreneurs and venture 
capitalists seems necessary to facilitate the negotiations and renegotiations 
without being held back by antiquated mandatory rules.65
 
2.2.2 Joint Ventures 
 
Unsuitable and rigid rules also present problems for joint ventures and strategic 
alliances,66 which, under the pressure of ongoing globalization, have become an 
important means of limiting risks, decreasing costs, and increasing economies of 
scale and scope.67 Many large firms enter into worldwide alliances and joint 
 
64  See Goetz, Ch.J, and Scott, R.E., Principles of Relational Contracts, Virginia Law 
Review 67, (1985), p. 296. 
65  Cf. Goldman, M.D. and Filliben, E.M., Corporate Governance: Current Trends and 
Likely Developments for the Twenty-First Century, Delaware Journal of Corporate 
Law 25, (2000) (arguing that the need to raise capital quickly and efficiently in 
different global capital markets will lead to the emergence of a universal entity, 
affording its creators maximum flexibility). Again, one should recognize that efficient 
business organization laws are only one ingredient in a robust economy. The supply of 
a menu of business forms alone is not sufficient for an entrepreneurial environment. 
For instance, even though the Chinese legislature promulgated a corporate form in the 
early 20th century, outside finance remained marginal. See Berkowitz, D. et al, 
Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect, Working Paper, (2001), 
p. 6 (referring to Gary Hamilton and Robert Feenstra, Varieties of Hierarchies and 
Markets, in M. Orru et al., The Economic Organization of East Asian Capitalism, 
(London: Thousand Oaks, 1997)). 
66  Strategic alliances and joint ventures can both be described as contractual 
relationships between distinct organizations that provide for sharing the costs and 
benefits of a mutually beneficial activity. Johnson, S.A. and Houston, M.B., A 
Reexamination of the Motives and Gains in Joint Ventures, Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 35, (2000), p. 70 note that strategic alliances are similar to joint 
ventures, but do not involve equity investments or the creation of a third party. See 
also Lewis, J.D., Trusted Partners; How Companies Build Mutual Trust and Win 
Together, (New York: The Free Press Lewis, 1999), pp. 4-5. This book speaks of joint 
ventures when partners create a separate ‘firm’ they jointly own and control. Alliances 
are viewed as long-term firm-like contracts. 
67  See. e.g., Kogut, B., Joint Ventures and The Option To Expand and Acquire, 
Management Science 37, (1991), pp. 19-20; Milgrom, P.R. and Roberts, J., 
Economics, Organization & Management, (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1992), 
p. 586; Raaijmakers, M.J.G.C., Joint Ventures, (Deventer: Kluwer,  1976); 
Raaijmakers, M.J.G.C. , Enkele rechtsvergelijkende beschouwingen over joint 
ventures, Preadvies uitgebracht voor de Nederlandse Vereniging voor 
Rechtsvergelijking, (Deventer: Kluwer, 1992); Ribstein, Limited Liability Unlimited, 
Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 24, (1999), p. 9; Rosenkranz, S. and Schmitz, P., 
Joint Ownership and Incomplete Contracts: The Case of Perfectly Substitutable 
Investments, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Discussion Paper No. 
2679, (2001), pp. 13-15; Shishido, Z., Conflicts of Interests and Fiduciary Duties in 




                                                                                                                        
ventures to obtain technological know-how. In addition, globalization and 
consumerism increasingly push SMEs to get involved in international joint 
ventures, both among themselves and together with larger multinationals, when 
access to manufacturing, distribution and other assets is too difficult or costly to 
create internally.68 At the same time, these joint ventures and alliances 
encourage the further development of new technologies and the reduction of 
international barriers.69  
Although the benefits of joint ventures are relatively straightforward, 
they are highly sensitive to conflict-of-interest situations.70 The partners are 
acutely conscious of these situations, and so pay careful attention to them in the 
joint venture agreement. The resulting relational contracts encompass dealings 
between the joint venture, venturers and third parties. A wide variety of 
Stilson, A.E., The Agile Virtual Corporation, Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 22, 
(1997), pp. 498-502; Vestal, A.W.,“Ask Me No Questions and I’ll Tell You No Lies”: 
Statutory and Common-Law Disclosure Requirements Within High-Tech Joint 
Ventures, Tulane Law Review 65, (1991), pp. 706-707. It is argued that these 
alliances and joint ventures will increasingly be the building blocks of the ‘next 
society’. See Drucker, P., The next society, A survey of the near future, Economist 
361, 3 November 2001, pp. 5 and 21 (arguing that although the next society has not 
quite arrived yet, firms should start experimenting with new corporate forms and 
conducting a few pilot studies, especially in working with alliances, partners and joint 
ventures); Pisano, G.P., R&D Performance, Collaborative Arrangements, and the 
Market-for-Know-How: A Test of the “Lemons” Hypothesis in Biotechnology, 
Harvard Business School Working Paper No. 97, (1997), p. 1 (observing that some 
commentators suggest that the vertically integrated enterprise has become outmoded 
in industries where technology changes rapidly and predict a future dominated by 
smaller, specialized enterprises that acquire and sell technologies through networks of 
inter-firm relationships and outsourcing arrangements).  
68  See OECD, Small and Medium Enterprise Outlook, Enterprise, Industry and Services, 
(2000), p. 13; European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, Creating an entrepreneurial Europe, the activities of the European Union for 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), COM(2001) 98 final, p. 75 (the Joint 
European Venture programme, with a guideline of €84 million for the period 1997-
2000, aimed at stimulating cooperation between SMEs by fostering the creation of 
transnational joint ventures between European Union SMEs). See also Sakai, K., 
Global Industrial Restructuring: Implications for Small Firms, OECD Directorate for 
Science, Technology and Industry, STI Working Papers 2002/4; Shapiro, C., 
Competition Policy and Innovation, OECD Directorate for Science, Technology and 
Industry, STI Working Papers 2002/11, p. 21. 
69  See Milgrom, P.R. and Roberts, J., Economics, Organization & Management, (Upper 
Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1992), p. 586. 
70  See Raaijmakers, M.J.G.C., Joint Ventures, (Deventer: Kluwer, 1976); Raaijmakers, 
M.J.G.C., Enkele rechtsvergelijkende beschouwingen over joint ventures, Preadvies 
uitgebracht voor de Nederlandse Vereniging voor Rechtsvergelijking, (Deventer: 
Kluwer, 1992). See also Shishido, Z., Conflicts of Interests and Fiduciary Duties in 
the Operation of a Joint Venture, Hastings Law Journal 39, (1988), p. 64 (dividing the 
conflict-of-interest situations into three categories: self-dealing conflicts, corporate 




                                                
protection and incentive provisions are included so as to protect relation-specific 
investments, such as exclusive selling rights, long-term delivery agreements, 
rights to veto important decisions and explicit exit rights. However, it is 
submitted that the joint venture agreement cannot solve all conflict of interest 
problems. Indeed, joint venture agreements are often incomplete, in that they are 
vague or silent on a number of key issues.71 This raises the question of which 
default rules can be used to complete the relational contract.72 In order to answer 
this question, it is important to know whether the partners have formed the joint 
venture as any particular type of business form, as the default rules of the 
applicable statute will fill the gaps in the agreement. Even if the parties have not 
explicitly made a choice-of-business-form decision,73 the joint venture could be 
 
71  Lawyer-economists usually invoke transaction costs to explain this incompleteness. 
Three such costs are most frequently mentioned: (1) unforeseen contingencies; (2) 
costs of writing contracts; and (3) costs of enforcing contracts. See Tirole, J., 
Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?, Econometrica 67, (1999), pp. 743-744. 
Parties sometimes deliberately choose not to draft all encompassing contracts, 
‘because they cannot observe relevant economic variables, because they cannot verify 
those variables to courts, or because they prefer not to disclose relevant information 
about themselves.’ See Schwartz, A., Incomplete Contracts, in P. Newman (ed.), The 
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, (London: Macmillan Reference 
Limited, 1998), Vol. 2, p. 282. See also Goetz, Ch.J, and Scott, R.E., Principles of 
Relational Contracts, Virginia Law Review 6, (1981) (‘Parties enter into relational 
contracts because such agreements present an opportunity to exploit certain 
economies. Each party wants a share of the benefits resulting from these economies 
and consequently seeks to structure the relationship so as to induce the other party to 
share the benefits of the exchange.’); Lewis, J.D., Trusted Partners; How Companies 
Build Mutual Trust and Win Together, (New York: The Free Press, 1999), pp. 263-
264 (illustrating how large firms in joint ventures often deliberately choose to draft 
only simple and incomplete contracts, because extensive contracts limit the flexibility, 
imply an understanding will not be implemented fairly, and affect the tone of the 
relationship). 
72  See Ribstein, L.E. and Kobayashi, B.H., Joint ventures, in P. Newman (ed.), The New 
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, (London: Macmillan Reference 
Limited, 1998) Vol. 2, p. 377. 
73  The literature distinguishes between equity and non-equity joint ventures. Equity joint 
ventures arise whenever two or more venturers contribute assets to a firm and are paid 
for some or all of their contributions from the profits earned by the firm. The term 
‘non-equity joint ventures’ describes a wide array of long-term relational contract 
arrangements, such as licensing, distribution and supply arrangements, or technical 
assistance and management contracts. See Hennart, J-F, A Transaction Costs Theory 
of Equity Joint Ventures, Strategic Management Journal 9, (1988), pp. 361-362. These 
non-equity joint ventures have several shortcomings: they are extremely lawyer-
intensive; they do not create an independent equity interest which is transferable; and 
they are largely dependent on the other parts of the venturers’ business. See Klein, 
A.M., Structuring the International Joint Venture, Practising Law Institute 835, 
(2002), pp. 27-29. Equity joint ventures are often explicitly structured as a legal 
business form, e.g., a partnership or corporation. See Urban, S. et al, Wirtschaftliche 
Vorgaben: Analyse der Zusammenarbeit der Unternehmen in Europa, in J. 
Boucourechliev and P. Hommelhoff (eds.), Vorschläge für eine Europäische 




                                                                                                                        
treated as a partnership.74 In that case, partnership law default rules are used as 
gap-fillers in the joint venture relationship. Although this treatment has many 
advantages over corporations, such as tax benefits, flexibility and privacy, the 
partners usually avoid vicarious liability for the venture’s debts by incorporating 
the joint venture.  
An incorporated joint venture is governed mainly by statute and articles 
of incorporation. Corporation law does not have partnership-like flexibility, and 
generally does not provide shareholders with the same kind of freedom to vary 
from statutory provisions. In fact, it appears that the joint venture agreement 
cannot always be easily imitated under the corporation laws of many 
jurisdictions, especially in continental Europe.75 In practice, lawyers often 
struggle to translate the shareholders’ wishes into a comprehensive set of articles 
of incorporation. In the case of a conflict between partners, provisions of the 
statute and the articles are likely to override the terms set forth in the joint 
venture agreement.76 The upshot is that such conflicts may dilute the value of a 
Gesellschaftsform, (Köln: Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, 1999), p. 19. Besides contractual 
and equity joint ventures, a third form of joint ventures could be distinguished: an 
asymmetric joint venture, where the joint venture partners acquire minority stakes in 
each other’s subsidiaries.  
74  See Ribstein, L.E. and Kobayashi, B.H., Joint ventures, in P. Newman (ed.), The New 
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, (London: Macmillan Reference 
Limited, 1998), Vol. 2, p. 377 (arguing that a contract that the parties designate as a 
joint venture or that has the characteristics of a joint venture and is not incorporated or 
formed as any particular type of business association is generally treated as a 
partnership in many countries. See also Heenen, J., Partnership and Other Personal 
Associations for Profit, in A. Conrad (ed.), Business and Private Organizations, 
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck Heenen , 
1975), Vol. XIII Chapter, pp. 188-190; Stengel, A., Joint Ventures, in W. Müller and 
W-D Hoffmann (eds.), Beck’sches Handbuch der Personengesellschaft, (München: 
C.H. Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung , 1999), §21; Volhard, R. and Stengel, A., 
German Limited Liability Company, (West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 1997), pp. 9-
10. 
75  See, e.g., Volhard, R. and Stengel, A., German Limited Liability Company, (West 
Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 1997), pp. 8-10 (‘The joint venture agreement can be 
treated as confidential, but the articles of association are open to public inspection. It 
is thus sometimes difficult to decide whether clear enforceability or confidentiality 
should prevail.’). For instance, a joint venture agreement which is typically 
incorporated in the articles in the United States is not easily folded into the Dutch 
articles of incorporation due to the restrictive quality of the Dutch code. Cf. 
Raaijmakers, M.J.G.C., Joint Ventures, (Deventer: Kluwer, 1976); Raaijmakers, 
M.J.G.C., Enkele rechtsvergelijkende beschouwingen over joint ventures, Preadvies 
uitgebracht voor de Nederlandse Vereniging voor Rechtsvergelijking, (Deventer: 
Kluwer, 1992). 
76  Cf. Karalis, J.P., International Joint Ventures, A Practical Guide, (St. Paul: West 
Publishing Co, 1992), pp. 100-121. Many hold that a joint venture agreement that 
predates incorporation dominates the relationship. However, in order to avoid 
confusion, it is advisable that the venturers specify the rules governing the joint 




                                                                                                                        
joint venture agreement upon incorporation. It is therefore argued that a limited 
liability vehicle that is truly flexible in formation, organization and control of the 
venture holds out the potential to provide cost-saving benefits and to encourage 
joint ventures.77  
 
2.2.3 Professional Service Firms 
 
The evolution of legal forms does not only benefit commercial business firms 
like SMEs and joint ventures.78 Until recently, the typical partnership, in which 
the partners are unlimitedly liable for the debts of the partnerships, was the 
dominant mode of organization for professional firms – sometimes because 
these firms were prohibited by ethical rules to employ a limited liability vehicle, 
but mostly because professionals simply preferred the traditional partnership 
form. However, in light of the progressive move towards commerce and finance, 
professional firms are frequently choosing limited liability vehicles to better 
protect themselves against the recent increase in malpractice claims and the 
threat of litigation.79  
It is submitted that the liability concerns of professionals are often the 
instigator of new partnership-type limited liability vehicles.80 The partners of the 
Bromberg and Ribstein on Partnership, (New York: Aspen Law and Business, 1999), 
§7.21; Ribstein, L.E. and Kobayashi, B.H. (1998), Joint ventures, in P. Newman (ed.), 
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, (London: Macmillan 
Reference Limited, 1998), Vol. 2, p. 377. 
77  See, e.g., Ribstein, Limited Liability Unlimited, Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 
24, (1999) (arguing that joint venture partners may prefer a business form that is 
governed by their specific contract rather than by the default rules of a standard type 
of business form, such as a partnership or corporation). In this respect, it is worth 
pointing to the 1994 introduction of the SAS in France, and its subsequent 
modification in 1999, creating the opportunity for partners in a joint venture to adopt a 
legal structure that is truly flexible in the organization and control of the firm. See 
Lazarski, H. and Lagarrigue, A., The “New” SAS, Legal and Tax Considerations, 
European Taxation 40, (2000); Omar, P.J., France: Company Law Reform: 
Innovation and Renovation, Company Lawyer 22 (2001), pp. 192-193.  
78  The distinction between professional and commercial firms has become more illusory 
than real in the past decades. 
79  See Economist, When partnerships unravel, 9 July 1994, pp. 13-14 (noting that 
liability law, particularly in America, has developed in a way that is damaging to all 
kinds of businesses); Economist, Partners in pain, 9 July 1994, pp. 63-64 (noting that 
mounting liability claims are threatening to kill off partnerships in professional 
service firms). See also Goforth, C.R., Limiting the Liability of General Partners in 
LLPs: An Analysis of Statutory Alternatives, Oregon Law Review 75, (1996), pp. 
1140-1142 (describing the liability crisis in the United States). 
80  In the United States, the LLP was originally restrictive in allowing only professionals 
to use the new form. However, during the legislation process or shortly after 




                                                                                                                        
big professional service firms (particularly, but not exclusively) feel the need for 
protection against liability for the malpractice or negligence of co-partners.81 
When their partners have become virtual strangers due to the growth and 
internationalization of the firm, they have less reason to trust them, let alone to 
put all their worldly belongings at the mercy of their mistakes.82 The 
Partnerschaftgesellschaft legislation, which was enacted in 1995 and which allows 
only professionals listed in §1 of the statute (Partnerschaftsgesellschaftsgesetz) to 
limit their personal liability, the UK LLP was initially designed to address the liability 
concerns of professional service firms. However, unlike the German form, the LLP 
statute, as enacted in April 2001, covers all types of businesses. See Bärwaldt, R., 
Partnerschaftgesellschaft, in W. Müller and W-D Hoffmann (eds.), Beck’sches 
Handbuch der Personengesellschaft, (München: C.H. Beck’sche 
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1999); Freedman, J., Limited Liability Partnerships in the UK 
– Do They Have a Role for Small Firms?, Journal of Corporation Law 26, (2001); 
Raaijmakers, M.J.G.C., The European Reform Agenda for Company and Securities 
Law, Perspectives on Business Enterprises in Light of the EU-US Comparison, in G.J. 
Niezen et al (eds.), Nederlands Genootschap van Bedrijfsjuristen, Ongebonden Recht 
Bedrijven, Bedrijfsjuridische opstellen op de grens van het derde millennium, 
(Deventer: Kluwer, 2000); Seibert, U. (1995), Einführung, Entwicklung, Begriff und 
Bedeutung der Partnerschaft, in B. Riegger and L. Weipert (eds.), Münchener 
Handbuch des Gesellschaftsrecht, Band 1, (München: C.H. Beck’sche 
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1995); Young, S., Limited Liability Partnerships – A Chance 
for Peace of Mind, Business Law Review 21, (2000). 
81  In the United States, accounting, law, consulting and architectural firms are using 
these new partnership-type limited liability vehicles. See, e.g., Hamilton, R.W., 
Registered Limited Liability Partnerships: Present at the Birth (Nearly), University of 
Colorado Law Review 66, (1995), pp. 1065-1066. The fact that British LLP 
regulations, unlike their US namesake, demand high levels of financial disclosure in 
exchange for a degree of protection against liabilities arising from negligence claims 
could partly explain the reluctance of the professions to convert into a UK LLP. It 
might also be argued that professional firms prefer unlimited liability to signal to the 
market for professional services that the partners stand behind the quality of their 
work. ‘It is, in effect, a bonding mechanism in a lemons market.’ See Banoff, B.A., 
Company Governance Under Florida’s New Limited Liability Company Act, Florida 
State University College of Law Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 
43, (2001), pp. 5 fn 14. In order to maintain the spirit of partnership in a time of 
increasing liability claims, each partner could set up his or her own ‘professional 
corporation’. The firm then becomes a partnership of the ‘professional corporations’ 
and the individuals who elected not to incorporate.  
82  After the Enron debacle, the Andersen accounting firm, which provided accounting 
and other services to Enron, hoped that the limited liability partnership structure 
would limit exposure to Enron-related fines and legal bills to the American business. 
It seems inconceivable, however, that the partners could remain free from the claims 
arising out of the malfeasance of the Houston office. Cf Economist, For Better, for 
worse, 16 March 2002, p. 18. See Ribstein, L.E., Aftermath of Enron May Test Limits 
on Professionals’ Liability, Legal Opinion Letter (Washington Legal Foundation) 12, 
16 March 2002 (‘Texas adopted the first LLP statute in 1991, in response to the 
savings and loan liabilities threatening large law firms. These statutes, born in the last 
big professional liability crisis, now have been adopted in every US jurisdiction. The 
current crisis may determine how well the statutes work.’). See also Finch, V. and 
Freedman, J., The Limited Liability Partnership: Pick and Mix or Mix-Up?, Journal of 




                                                                                                                        
combination of limited liability protection and flexibility of organizing the firm 
in such a manner, as they seem fit, is a very attractive feature of a partnership-
type limited liability vehicle.  
 
3 THE PROSPECT OF NEW PARTNERSHIP-TYPE BUSINESS FORMS IN EUROPE 
 
The potential introduction of new business forms holds out the prospect of 
overcoming the negative effects of lock-in. We now turn to regulatory 
competition theory, and ask whether there are sufficient incentives to create 
adequate demand for the introduction and diffusion of new partnership-type 
business forms. 
In Europe, the pressures of competitive lawmaking have induced 
domestic lawmakers to take action and initiate law reform projects with respect 
to business organization law. To the extent that these lawmakers had few 
revenue-based incentives for researching and designing the optimal rules for all 
types of firms, they have attempted – for the most part – to apply the legal 
provisions designed for typical small partnerships or large publicly held 
enterprises to a wide range of closely held firms. The issue here is whether, in 
the context of regulatory competition, the ‘integrated framework’ that seems to 
prevail across Europe will dominate, or whether, as a result of increased 
competition, the ‘free-standing’ approach, which involves creating separate 
business forms, can emerge. Because most national legislatures in Europe 
voluntarily apply the EU Directives on publicly held corporations to the closely 
held corporate form (implicit linkage), it might be argued that the integrated 
approach prevails. This suggests that a major source of lock-in for most 
jurisdictions appears to be the implicit linkage of close and public corporation 
structures. 
This article proposes, in contrast, that in a competitive legal 
environment, where the signalling function of business forms becomes more 
important, business forms for firm organization provided for by law should be 
adapted to prevailing forms of ownership and incentive structures. Given the 
significant role of a specialized judiciary and related case law in conferring large 
benefits to firms, a ‘de-linked’ legal form that has distinctive statutory qualities 
for a certain group of business firms is arguably better equipped to commit 
courts and arbitrators to future responsiveness. 
Minefield of Unintended Consequences – The Traps of Limited Liability Law Firms, 




                                                
It seems clear that as Europe enters the competitive lawmaking 
environment, lawmakers will mainly focus on the needs of business firms that 
are most likely to engage in forum shopping. Since the Directives regarding 
publicly held corporations have reduced the feasibility of competition in the 
context of large corporations, European lawmakers will begin to turn their 
attention to ‘closely held firms’, such as large professional firms, venture capital 
funds, joint ventures, and start-ups generally. Although jurisdictional 
competition in Europe is still in a developmental stage, the empirical evidence 
lends support to this view. We can already foresee a pattern of regulatory 
competition in the context of business organization law that prompts competitive 
lawmakers to innovate by initiating law reforms and introducing new legal 
entities that are better equipped than the traditional partnership and corporate 




It follows from the above discussion that the evolution of partnership-type 
business forms presents clear benefits for a wide range of business and 
professional firms. Empirical studies tend to confirm that the modernized and 
new business forms have advantages over traditional partnership and close 
corporation forms.83 For instance, the US LLC and LLP, which combine a menu 
of limited liability, flexibility-respecting governance terms and a choice of tax 
treatments, allow firms to select legal forms that are compatible with their 
organizational features. Consequently, it is often claimed that the development 
of a menu of ‘off-the-rack’ business forms will eventually provide an efficient, 
low-cost solution to the governance problems of closely held firms. 
 
83  For instance, the LLC is becoming a very attractive and widely accepted vehicle in the 
United States. See Goldman, M.D. and Filliben, E.M., Corporate Governance: 
Current Trends and Likely Developments for the Twenty-First Century, Delaware 
Journal of Corporate Law 25, (2000), p. 707 (citing the Delaware Supreme Court: 
‘The phenomenon of business arrangements using “alternative entities” has been 
developing rapidly over the past several years. Long gone are the days when business 
planners were confined to corporate or partnership structures.’); Ribstein, L.E. and 
Kobayashi, B.H., Choice of Form and Network Externalities, William and Mary Law 
Review 43, (2001) (supplying empirical evidence of the popularity of the US LLC). 
The earliest empirical evidence on registrations of UK LLPs, compiled by company 
registration agents Jordans, shows that a wide variety of small and medium-sized 
enterprises are most attracted to this new limited liability vehicle. Astonishingly, more 
than 75% of the LLPs registered in the first few months after 6 April 2001 have been 
drawn from the wider business community. This pattern of registration is important 
because it reverses the assumption that LLPs are appealing only to professionals 




                                                
A closer look at the recent developments of closely held business forms 
within the European Union and the United States shows that competitive 
pressures have driven the rapid evolution of ‘new partnership law’. It turns out 
that regulatory competition creates a dynamic law that is responsive to the varied 
needs of modern firms.84 In sharp contrast to the US evolution story, however, 
the recent expansion of business forms within the European Union has arguably 
been disadvantaged by a legal framework that includes mandatory rules derived 
from public corporation law, which has been greatly influenced by European 
directives.85 Apparently, there are a number of interest group barriers that 
prevent member states from adopting more cost-effective legal business 
structures for closely held firms. The legal regimes used by European closely 
held firms to organize their businesses are likely to lead to high costs, and do not 
meet the full range of their contracting needs.  
Moreover, the continuous use of the close corporation, even if not 
ideally suited to a wide range of closely held firms, will serve to reduce the 
incentives for lawmakers to innovate. Given the manner in which lawmakers 
have responded to date, the emergence of new legal innovations responsive to 
the needs of closely held firms appears to be unlikely, especially in the absence 
of fully-fledged competitive lawmaking. In most European jurisdictions, the 
SME business community is not likely to play a featured role in the evolution of 
business forms. The national lawmaking process is led by politicians and civil 
servants who give high priority to the preferences of large firms. Thus, unless 
national lawmakers find a compelling reason to actively develop statutory 
changes, closely held firms are likely to be locked into an inefficient framework. 
The advent of competitive pressures from offshore jurisdictions, 
however, has created some incentives for national policymakers to generate new 
statutory measures. The recent enactment of the LLP statute in the United 
Kingdom in order to stem the outflow of professional firms to Jersey, which 
created an LLP statute in 1996, is an example of competitive lawmaking in 
Europe. Hence, if Europe succeeds in creating conditions more conducive to 
regulatory competition, one could expect more member states to be involved in, 
as in the United States, creating a variety of legal rules that are beneficial to 
different types of closely held firms. 
 
84  See Ribstein, L.E., The Evolving Partnership, Journal of Corporation Law 26, (2001).  
85  For instance, the imposition of minimum capital requirements and disclosure rules. 
Cf. Wouters, J., European Company Law: Quo Vadis?, Common Market Law Review 
37, (2000), p. 301 (arguing that the French SAS should be recalled if the new business 
form was introduced partly to avoid the capital protection rules of the Second 
Directive). 
